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Trends in the use of foreign law: A review of Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The Use of 
Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional Systems 
John Stanton* 
Abstract: This review article offers a discussion of Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The 
Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional Systems and explores the contribution 
the book makes to an ever growing corner of comparative constitutional law. It starts 
by placing scholarship focusing on judicial use of foreign law within the broader 
field, marking out Ferrari’s contribution as comprehensive. It then explains, in detail, 
some of the trends that can be identified from Ferrari’s text, embarking on a 
discussion of the varying ways in which jurisdictions across the world make use of 
foreign law. 
Keywords: comparative constitutional law; foreign law; judicial use of foreign law 
(explicit; non-explicit; and limited) 
I. Introduction - comparative constitutional law 
Comparative constitutional law has emerged relatively recently as a prominent area of legal 
scholarship.  
“From its beginnings as a relatively obscure and exotic subject studied by a devoted 
few, comparative constitutionalism has developed into one of the more vibrant and 
exciting subjects in contemporary legal scholarship, and has become a cornerstone of 
constitutional jurisprudence and constitution-making in an increasing number of 
countries worldwide”.1 
Explaining the relative youth of the area, Rosenfield and Sajó also discuss the manner in 
which “constitutional law was often neglected in the comparative study of great legal systems 
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1 Ran Hirschl, “Comparative Methodologies” in Roger Masterman and Robert Schütze (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 11, 11. 
... [possibly] due to the difficulties in finding universal elements in constitutional law”.2 It is 
in part for this reason that they go on to explain how “[c]omparative constitutional law 
scholarship did not emerge as an academic discipline until after the Second World War”.3 
Since then, though, there has been a burst of academic contributions to the field, offering a 
fast growing library of scholarship that focuses on a wealth of different issues and 
discussions.4 These include comparative exploration of fundamental constitutional principles; 
discussion of the varying ways in which human rights are protected across the world; 
differing constitutional structures and arrangements; and consideration of the ways in which 
constitutions come into effect and are amended. In these – and many other – ways, the field 
of comparative constitutional law has, like many other areas of legal scholarship, become 
subdivided into more specifically focused, or niche, areas.  
 One such subdivision concerns the way in which supreme and constitutional courts 
across the world draw from and use foreign law in reaching their decisions and in informing 
their judgments. Foreign law, in this context, is a broad term. It can refer to legal instruments, 
case law or academic writings that have been introduced in another jurisdiction. To a large 
extent, it includes laws passed and cases decided in other countries, often of similar or 
relatable constitutional foundation, but it can also refer to laws and cases on a supranational 
plane (e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights5 or the European Union6) and 
provisions and decisions of international law. As discussions below will indicate, the use of 
“foreign law” differs greatly across the world and is dependent upon a number of factors. 
Generally speaking, though, and with some notable exceptions, the practice is a relatively 
recent one. Murray explains why this is: 
                                               
2 Michel Rosenfield and András Sajó, “Introduction” in Michel Rosenfield and András Sajó (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1, 5. 
3 Ibid., 5, citing Günther Doeker-Mach, “Comparative Constitutional Law: Reflections on the Past and Concerns 
about the Future” in Günther Doeker-Mach and Klaus A. Ziegert (eds), Law, Legal Culture and Politics in the 
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4 See, for example, Michel Rosenfield and András Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Roger Masterman and Robert Schütze (eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2019). 
5 Hereinafter ECHR. 
6 Hereinafter EU. 
“That national courts increasingly refer to the case law of foreign and international 
courts is a phenomenon indicative of the era in which we live. That is to say, the era 
of globalisation … Courts, particularly supreme or constitutional courts, are more 
than ever looking at how complex jurisprudential problems are resolved in judicial 
decisions of foreign countries”.7  
The global emergence of this trend and the value with which it is regarded is also explained by 
Halmai, who notes that: 
“Judicial use of foreign law … has been made possible by a dialogue among high court 
judges with constitutional jurisdiction around the world, conducted through mutual 
citation and increasingly direct interactions. This growing ‘constitutional cross-
fertilization’ can prove to be not only a tool for better judicial judgments, but eventually 
also for the construction of a ‘global legal system’”.8 
The value of foreign law is self-evident. As the world becomes smaller, better connected and 
with increased emphasis on the “global”, use of foreign law, as a manifestation of globalization, 
encourages states to look beyond their own borders and to contribute to and engage with “an 
international community of courts that share similar views on similar legal questions”.9 Indeed, 
in Duranti’s chapter in Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The Foreign Law in Contemporary 
Constitutional Systems, the former Chief Justice of the Norwegian Supreme Court is cited as 
explaining that “[i]t is a natural obligation that, in so far as we have the capacity, we should 
take part in European and international debate and mutual interaction. It is the duty of national 
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Supreme Courts” in Giuseppe Franco Ferrari (ed.), Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The Use of Foreign Law in 
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courts … to introduce new legal ideas from the outside world into national judicial decisions”.10 
In this context, the use of foreign law has quickly emerged as an interesting and valuable area 
of comparative constitutional law and it is in this field that Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The 
Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional Systems places its contribution. This article 
offers a review of the book, outlining its approach and its contribution to the field, before going 
to identify the way in which its various discussions and chapters reflect an interesting trend as 
regards judicial use of foreign law. 
II. Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The Use of Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional 
Systems 
Judicial Cosmopolitanism: The Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional Systems, edited 
by Giusseppe Franco Ferrari of Bocconi University in Milan, is a comprehensive anthology of 
the way in which constitutional courts the world over draw from and use foreign law in 
deciding their own cases and developing their own judgments and case law. It is vast in its 
scope, with 31 chapters arranged geographically and discussing approaches taken across 
Europe, Asia, Latin America, Israel and various Common Law countries. Each chapter has 
been written by a specialist in that particular jurisdiction, bringing together a wealth of 
expertise that serves to make this the book on the subject. In the opening chapter, Ferrari 
attributes the growing prominence of judicial use of foreign law to “the recourse to comparative 
law (and indeed international law) by the US Supreme Court at the turn of the millennium and 
in the first few years of the new century”.11 Indeed, the cases of Lawrence v. Texas12 and Roper 
v. Simmons13 are singled out as indicating the developing “worldwide interest” afforded to the 
study of comparative constitutional interpretation. 14  It is here that our exploration of the 
judicial practice starts.  
                                               
10 Statement by Carsten Smith - Chief Justice of the Norwegian Supreme Court (1991 - 2002) - quoted in Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, (2003) 44 Harv. Int’l L J 194 - 195, cited at Francesco 
Duranti, “The Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Interpretation by the Nordic Courts” in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 461, 469.   
11 Giuseppe Franco Ferrari, “Introduction: Judicial Constitutional Comparison and its Varieties” in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 1, 2 – 3.  
12 39 U. S. 558 (2003). 
13 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
14 Ferrari, (n 11), 3. 
 In Lawrence v. Texas, the US Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a “Texas 
statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual 
conduct” contravened the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.15 
In finding that it did, Supreme Court Justice Kennedy drew from the European Court of Human 
Rights16decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom17, a case that Kennedy acknowledged had 
“parallels” with that before the court in Lawrence.18 In Dudgeon, the ECtHR held that Mr. 
Dudgeon had suffered “an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his private life. 
… [protected by] Article 8 [ECHR]”,19 as a result of the criminalization in Northern Ireland of 
sexual activity between consenting adults of the same sex. In a similar token, and referring to 
the Strasbourg Court’s decision, the Supreme Court in Lawrence held that any American laws 
that prohibited sexual activity between adults of the same sex were unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court Justices, therefore, not only made explicit reference to foreign law but also 
drew from that law in reaching its own decision. Similarly, in the case of Roper v. Simmons, 
the US Supreme Court was asked to consider whether imposing capital punishment against a 
juvenile offender was consistent with the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the 
Constitution. In finding that the Constitution was infringed by such a sentence, Justice Kennedy 
again drew from legal systems across the world and noted that  
“only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders 
since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and China. Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital 
punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. In sum, it is fair to 
say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against 
the juvenile death penalty”.20 
These two cases, therefore, demonstrate how foreign law informed the US Supreme Court’s 
decision and its own practices of constitutional interpretation. Despite the significance Ferrari 
attributes to these cases, though, they are by no means the first or the most significant instances 
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16 Hereinafter ECtHR. 
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18 39 U. S. 558 (2003), 573. 
19 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981), para. 63. 
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of judicial recourse to foreign law. Indeed, and notwithstanding these cases, the US Supreme 
Court nowadays makes virtually no reference to foreign law, as this article will go on later to 
explain. Elsewhere in the world, though, the trend has persisted and grown in recent years. The 
breadth of this trend is acknowledged by Ferrari who, in the Introduction to this book, explains 
how the differing constitutional systems considered throughout Judicial Cosmopolitanism can 
be categorized and sub-divided within the field. On this foundation, the book does very well to 
unite a very broad range of legal systems and constitutional practices together within focused 
themes and discussions, also picking out existing literature within relevant areas and giving an 
insight into the way in which judicial activities concerning foreign law fit within the broader 
constitutional structures and practices of each country at issue. In this way, the Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism makes an extremely valuable contribution to the field and to the area of 
comparative constitutional law generally. As a means of demonstrating this contribution, the 
article now goes on to identify and examine the differing emphases that countries across the 
world place on the use of foreign law and how the actual practice of referring to foreign law 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
II. Comparing the use of foreign law in courts across the world 
Looking across the various countries discussed in Judicial Cosmopolitanism that make use of 
foreign law, it is possible to identify certain categories that reflect differing practices and 
approaches. Though Halmai notes that “constitutional jurisdictions tend to fall into one of three 
categories: those which do not use foreign law … those which do use foreign law but do not 
do so explicitly, and those which do so explicitly”,21 there are possibly two further categories 
that might also be identified. These are, namely, where foreign law is used in limited 
circumstances or to a limited degree; and where the practice of using foreign law has fluctuated 
over time. Drawing from both Halmai’s contributions to the field, as well as these additional 
categories,  it is the purpose of this section of the article to discuss and examine how some of 
the countries discussed in Judicial Cosmopolitanism fall under one of the following four 
headings: (a) countries making explicit use of foreign law; (b) countries making limited use of 
foreign law; (c) countries making non-explicit use of foreign law; and (d) countries where the 
use of foreign law has varied over time. In so doing, this section focuses extensively on Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, thereby demonstrating the extent of its contribution to the field.  
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A. Explicit use of foreign law 
There are a number of states across the world and discussed in Judicial Cosmopolitanism that 
make clear and blatant use of foreign law in their constitutional courts. In India, “the Supreme 
Court … make[s] detailed analysis of relevant judicial decisions, commentaries and scholarly 
writings from other jurisdictions, especially where the court is propounding a new legal 
principle”. 22  In Latin America, “[t]he use of comparative law by both Supreme and 
Constitutional courts is a fundamental part of the legal tradition”;23 and in the Middle East, 
“the Israeli Supreme Court has always made abundant use of foreign law in its  adjudication”.24 
Use of foreign law in these jurisdictions enables the judiciary to engage in a global 
conversation, through which judges are able to contribute to their own experiences and findings 
to “an international community of courts that share similar views on similar legal questions”.25 
Indeed, and echoing this, Pierdominici, in the chapter on Israel, talks about the way in which 
use of foreign law permits states to become “a prominent participant in those transnational 
judicial conversations described by scholars as a global phenomenon based on comparative 
law”.26 The value of judicial use of foreign law, then, is – again – self-evident. As Granat notes 
in commenting on Poland’s broad use of “comparative analysis” in the Constitutional Tribunal, 
“[i]t seems a natural way of judging by a constitutional court”.27 
 Across the range of countries in which courts make full and explicit use of foreign law, 
though, an interesting trend can be identified. Broadly speaking, there appears to be a 
correlation between those states where foreign law is readily cited by the courts and the relative 
age and origin of that state’s constitution. To put this another way, where a country’s 
constitutional system draws from or is influenced by other systems across the world, then there 
appears to be greater willingness to refer to foreign law. This is readily apparent from many of 
                                               
22 Anton Cooray, “Developing an Indian constitutional jurisprudence drawing on judicial thinking in the rest of 
the common law world” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 177, 187. 
23 Polacchini, (n 9), 849. 
24 Leonardo Pierdominici, “The Supreme Court of Israel and the use of Comparative Law” in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 853, 858. 
25 Polacchini, (n 9), 850. 
26 Pierdominici, (n 24), 869. 
27 Miroslaw Granat, “Comparative analysis in the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland” in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 567, 587. 
the discussions in Judicial Cosmopolitanism. India, for example, along with other notable 
countries across the common law world, is governed by a post-colonial constitution; that is, 
one established following India’s independence from the British Empire in 1947. Given that 
British rule had dominated for so long and so prominently in India, though, it is not surprising 
that “[t]he British constitutional system … influenced the Indian drafters”.28 Their system, in 
other words, was not purely homegrown but was instead built up on a foundation of what might 
be regarded as foreign law. The willingness of countries such as India nowadays to draw from 
and refer to foreign law, then, is arguably embedded within the fabric of their respective 
systems. Where a state’s constitution is itself rooted in foreign law, that state’s courts appear 
more willing and inclined to continue the practice of referring to foreign law in deciding cases 
and in interpreting that constitution. Indeed, substantiating this reality, it is interesting that the 
UK and US constitutional systems, which were generally home-grown and created internally, 
do not have such a wide and established system of referring to foreign law, as this article goes 
on to discuss.  
 The use of foreign law in establishing a fresh system of government in a newly 
independent country is particularly evident across Eastern Europe, as various chapters through 
Parts III and IV of Judicial Cosmopolitanism discuss in detail. Estonia, for example, was 
“[h]istorically bound to the German legal culture”. 29  Consequently, when it gained 
independence in 1991, “[t]he most influential model for reconstruction of vast parts of the 
Estonian legal order was modern German law”.30 Similarly, in the Czech Republic, “[i]n its 
formative years, the Czech Constitutional Court used foreign law in order to transplant into the 
Czech legal system important constitutional doctrines from the West European states and the 
United States”.31 And, finally, in Croatia, “during the initial phase of democratic transition, the 
Croatian constitutional document … [was] modelled by imitating Constitutions belonging to 
                                               
28 Anashri Pillay, “The Constitution of the Republic of India” in Roger Masterman and Robert Schütze (eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2019), 141, 145. 
29 Madis Ernits, “The use of foreign law by Estonian Supreme Court” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 501, 506. 
30 Ibid., 506. 
31 Jana Ondřejková, Kristina Blažková and Jan Chmel, “The use of foreign legal materials by the Constitutional 
Court of the Czech Republic” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 589, 617. 
the Western legal tradition”.32 In all of these systems (Estonia, Czechia and Croatia), reference 
to Western European law has become a common judicial practice, as Judicial Cosmopolitanism 
makes abundantly clear. Indeed, backing up this trend, Erdós and Tanács-Manadák, explain, 
in noting how the Hungarian Constitutional Court has also made wide use of foreign and 
international law: 
“In most of the Western European countries, constitutional courts were established 
after the Second World War, while in Central and Eastern Europe, these organs were 
founded only after the fall of communism. The distinctive and esteemed Austrian, 
German, Italian, French and Spanish Constitutional Courts were examples of good 
practice for the Central and Eastern European courts”.33 
The constitutional development in the States of Former Yugoslavia, discussed in the chapter 
by Gian Antonio Benacchio, though, are perhaps the most prominent example of foreign law 
informing the emergence of a new constitutional order. Benacchio states that “I do not think 
there are other countries in the world where the comparative study of laws by national courts 
and jurists has been so important and evident as in the states of former Yugoslavia”.34 Judges 
in those states, and perhaps more so than any other Eastern European system, “stud[ied] and 
compare[d] foreign models”.35 In so doing, though, they “were not limited to Austrian, German 
or Swiss laws, but also included EU, English, US, Italian and other similar laws”.36  
 It is interesting to see, therefore, the factors underpinning judicial use of foreign law in 
jurisdictions where the practice readily and commonly takes place. Though, as Polacchini and 
Pierdominici explain, in their respective chapters, there are some systems where judges 
embrace the use of foreign law as a means of engaging with a broader, transnational 
conversation, the more prominent instances appear to be where constitutional systems have 
                                               
32 Carna Pistan, “Constitutional adjudication and comparative law in the Republic of Croatia” in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 650, 654, citing Wiktor Osiatynsky, “Paradoxes of constitutional borrowing” (2003) 1(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 244. 
33 Csaba Erdős and Fanni Tanàcs-Mandàk, “Use of foreign law in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court – with special regard to the period between 2012 and 2016” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 618, 618. 
34 Gian Antonio Benacchio, “National courts and comparative law – the States of Former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, 
Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro)” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 745. 
35 Ibid., 760 - 761. 
36 Ibid., 760 - 761. 
emerged as a result of a country achieving independence. In those systems, foreign law seems 
to provide something of a blueprint for constitutional design, often with a particular emphasis 
on the system from which the country in question sought independence. This practice is 
prominent in those Eastern European countries whose democratic systems of government 
emerged in the early 1990s, following the fall of communism, but it can also be seen in 
countries that sought independence from the British Empire, such as India, Australia and 
Canada. Ultimately, in those systems that make explicit use of foreign law, Botelho notes (in 
discussing the practice in Portugal) that “[o]ne should not fear constitutional comparative law 
… Nowadays, courts are asked to decide about unstable or new legal concepts that challenge 
constitutional law in a way like never before … jurisdictional dialogue and legal comparison 
that can offer new insights are more than welcome”.37 
B. Limited use of foreign law 
The second category of countries to consider concerns those states who make limited use of 
foreign law. As this section will explain, some states - whether through explicit or covert 
reference - draw from foreign law to a very limited degree. In Spain, for instance, the 
“Constitutional Court is among the courts that resort explicitly to comparative law, including 
foreign precedents, in the legal grounds and in particular opinions, but only … [on] very rare 
occasions”.38 Similarly, in Italy, “[t]he number of decisions by the Italian Constitutional Court 
in which there is an explicit reference to foreign law, foreign case-law and comparative law is 
extremely limited”. 39  These - and other - states are discussed at length in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, with authors in those chapters providing detailed consideration of the 
reasons underpinning the limited use of foreign law. These reasons are numerous and are 
explained briefly here.  
 The first is where a court is seemingly unwilling or reluctant to refer to foreign law. In 
the Russian Constitutional Court, for example, between 1991 and 2015 “on a total of more than 
                                               
37 Catarina Santos Botelho, “Is there a middle ground between constitutional patriotism and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism? The Portuguese Constitutional Court and the use of foreign (case) law” in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 424, 445. 
38 Ángel Aday Jiménez Alemán, “The Spanish Constitutional Court and foreign and comparative law: Theory 
and Practice of a Marriage of Convenience” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 375, 381. 
39 Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, “The Italian Constitutional Court” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 449, 453. 
eleven thousand decisions … only six references to decisions by foreign courts are found”.40 
This is not to say that Russian judges are unaware or ignorant of relevant parts of foreign law, 
it is just reflective of an unwillingness to make explicit reference.41 Russia, though, is not 
simply an example of a state making non-explicit reference to foreign law, but rather one in 
which the aforementioned unwillingness appears to motivate a reluctance to consider foreign 
law at all. As Mazza explains in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, “[t]he fact … that … [reference to 
foreign law] is made by the dissenting judges, sometimes later fallen into political disgrace, is 
… indicative of the reluctance of the constitutional judges who form the majority in the 
decisions of the Court to pay [any] great attention to foreign laws”.42  
The second reason explaining some states’ limited use of foreign law is where the 
practice is not commonplace, meaning that the courts might lack the habit or experience of 
readily making references to such law. In the UK, for example, whilst the Supreme Court has, 
over the years, drawn from various foreign sources of law, it is notable that virtually all the 
cases discussed in Frosini’s chapter in Judicial Cosmopolitanism were decided within the last 
decade. Therefore, whilst it might be that the Supreme Court “is likely to cite a decision of a 
foreign court in around one in three cases”,43 the still recent emergence of the practice in the 
UK means that the court is perhaps limited in its experience compared to some other 
jurisdictions around the world. Indeed, Frosini cites Lord Mance – former Deputy President of 
the UK Supreme Court - in concluding that “one would be gravely mistaken to believe that the 
UKSC is in the forefront in terms of judicial internationalisation, cosmopolitanism or dialogue 
… ‘the Supreme Court should itself aim to acquire a comparative legal and linguistic 
expertise’”.44  
                                               
40 Mauro Mazza, “The Russian Constitutional Court and the judicial use of comparative law: A problematic 
relationship” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 531, 545. 
41 See: ibid., 549. 
42 Ibid., 552. 
43 Justin O. Forsini, “Splendid isolation or open to the world? The use of foreign law by the UK Supreme Court” 
in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 29, 66, citing Hélène Tyrrell, Human Rights in the UK and the Influence of 
Foreign Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018), 194. 
44 Ibid., 67, citing Lord Mance, Foreign Laws and Languages, in A. Burrows, D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann 
(eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 96 - 97.  
There also appears to be, in some countries, substantive limits to the practice of 
referring to foreign law. What this means is that, rather than judges being reluctant or 
inexperienced to make reference to such laws, a court might limit itself to citing foreign law in 
respect of only certain matters or, indeed, only making reference to the laws of certain 
countries. In Germany, for example, Haberl explains that “the German Federal Constitutional 
Court seems to engage in a rather introverted prospective because it is ‘more or less ignoring 
foreign law and precedent’: on average the Court refers to foreign materials only a few times a 
year”.45 One of the main factors in this limited use of foreign law in Germany, though, appears 
to relate to the substantive areas relevant to the discussion. In other words, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court appears to be more willing in some areas rather than others to engage with 
and refer to foreign law. “Due to their high degree of universalism, [for instance,] fundamental 
rights particularly lend themselves to the adoption of foreign solutions. [Whilst a] second 
important group within which the Constitutional Court frequently refers to foreign materials 
are decisions regarding the concretisation and interpretation of general principles of law”.46 In 
a similar vein, though in a markedly different system, in the Netherlands, use of foreign law in 
constitutional review is only permitted in the context of international law and in the application 
of rights derived from international law.47 This limitation is based on the reality that “[t]he 
Netherlands … does not have a Constitutional Court, nor much in the way of constitutional 
review proper. The Dutch Constitution even contains a ban on constitutional review”.48 As a 
consequence of this, the Dutch have had to establish a system of constitutional review rather 
different from more conventional systems, as Voermans explains in the chapter. Ultimately, it 
lies with Parliament.49 Limits on the countries to which courts might make reference is evident 
in Switzerland. Though use of foreign law is a key part of the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s work, 
                                               
45 Sonja Haberl, “Comparative reasoning in constitutional litigation: Functions, methods and selected case law 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 295, 296, citing Stefan Martini, 
“Lifting the constitutional curtain? The Use of foreign precedent by the German Federal Constitutional Court” 
in Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds.), The use of foreign precedents by constitutional judges 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 230. 
46 Ibid., 305, citing Peter Haberle, Grundrechtsgeltung und Grundrechsinterpretation im Verfassungsstaat. 
Zugleich zur Rechtsvergleichung als “funfte” Auslegungsmethode (1989) 44 JZ 913. 
47 See: Wim Voermans, “Conspicuous absentees in the Dutch legal order: Constitutional review and a 
Constitutional Court” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 337, 343. 
48 Ibid., 337. 
49 See: ibid., 339 – 340. 
emphasis is very much placed on legal systems geographically proximate. “[I]n many of the 
rulings the tendency of the Federal Tribunal to consider for the purposes of comparison a 
limited number of legal systems is easily understood, and specifically those, also 
geographically, close to Switzerland (Germany, France, Italy and Austria)”. 50  Whilst, as 
Gerotto notes, such an approach is understandable, “in some rulings the comparative exam 
made by the Federal Tribunal might have – actually it should have – been extended to a broader 
range of legal systems than the considered one, so to dismiss the suspicion of a convenient 
comparison”.51  
 As this section has explored, there are a number of jurisdictions across the world where 
there is a limited practice of referring to foreign law, as various chapters in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism explain. Such limits are imposed either through some procedural reticence 
or inexperience; or through some substantive restriction, such as a limit to systems 
geographically proximate or a limit to areas of law that most warrant consideration of foreign 
law.  
C. Use of foreign law without explicit reference 
Separate from those jurisdictions in which limited use of foreign law is made, there are those 
who make wide use of foreign law but who do so without explicit reference. This can be seen 
in countries like France, where “comparative law has had (and continues to have) a highly 
significant role in the activity of the Constitutional Council … the Council’s judgments 
[though] contain[ing] no express reference to foreign or comparative law”.52 Similarly, in 
Norway, whilst the “former Chief Justice of the Norwegian Supreme Court [explains that]: ‘the 
Supreme Court has to an increasing degree taken part in international collaboration among the 
                                               
50 Sergio Gerotto, “The use of comparison in the Swiss Federal Tribunal case law” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 
402, 422. 
51 Ibid., 422. 
52 Paulo Passaglia, “Comparative Law and the French Constitutional Council” in Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 
263, 263. 
highest courts’ … [as Duranti notes that] explicit references to foreign precedents in 
constitutional litigations are almost non-existent”.53 
 It is interesting to consider why some countries – such as those discussed in this section 
– make frequent yet non-explicit use of foreign law. Distinct from some countries, such as 
Russia, where use of foreign law is both limited and covert, wide yet non-explicit use of foreign 
law would not necessarily appear to reflect an unwillingness to engage with foreign sources. 
In the chapter on France, Passaglia considers, for instance, that it is perhaps down to attitude, 
there being “a certain resistance [that] has developed against the use of foreign law” and a 
desire “to avoid the role of comparative law from being formally challenged by its 
opponents”.54 It is evidently easier in such instances to make more subtle use of foreign law to 
protect from such challenges. 
D. Changing patterns in the use of foreign law 
The final area for consideration in this article relates to those countries discussed in Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism in which the practice of referring to foreign law has changed over time. It 
has already been discussed how the use of foreign law in the UK Supreme Court is a relatively 
recent practice, and that is one such example of a changing pattern in this regard. There are 
other examples, too, though. In Austria, for instance, though the Constitutional Court “does not 
show a lot of explicit references to foreign law or to comparative arguments … [b]efore … [the 
early 1980s] there exist hardly any references to foreign precedents or foreign jurisdiction in 
the case law of the … Court”. 55  In Latvia, the opposite trend is apparent, since “[t]he 
Constitutional Court [in Latvia] has referred to foreign legal sources most frequently in the 
initial stage of its activities (1996 - 2000) for the simple reason that the case law was not 
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(1991 - 2002) - quoted in Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, (2003) 44 Harv. Int’l L J 194 
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54 Passaglia, (n 52), 289. 
55 Christoph Grabenwarter, “Comparative Law in the case law of the Austrian Constitutional Court” in Judicial 
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developed. A study found that the year 2007 marked a decrease in references”.56 References to 
foreign law are still made in Latvia, though just not as frequently as they once were.  
 Decreasing references to foreign law are also evident in the USA. Ferrari explains that, 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, federal and state courts made limited use of foreign law, 
the famous case of Roe v Wade57 being a prominent example. Upon this foundation, “[t]he 
opening up of a new front of judicial activism in terms of the use of foreign materials from a 
comparative or international law perspective” emerged.58 Indeed, and as a consequence, Ferrari 
devotes a section of the chapter in Judicial Cosmopolitanism to developments that occur 
between 1990 and 2005 and the flood of judgments that see the use of foreign law in the US 
become far more common. More recently, though, there has been a growing reluctance to 
accept the relevance of foreign law. Supreme Court Justice Scalia, for instance, is cited as 
noting that “[t]o invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and [to] ignore it 
otherwise, is not reasoned decision making, but sophistry”.59 Ferrari goes on to observe that 
the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law has also “triggered a backlash … in Congress[, with] 
a not insignificant grouping within Congress … react[ing] with nationalist overtones to a 
supposed trend within case law, using various instruments … draft legislation has been tabled 
seeking to codify and in some sense to prohibit the recourse to non-national sources”.60 Ferrari 
rightly devotes ample space to this discussion of what he calls “American isolationism”.61 Its 
significance is evident by the reality that “for some years the Supreme Court has refrained from 
resorting to the foreign or international law argument … [whilst] a majority of the States … as 
of 2013, had underway statutes aiming at prohibiting judges from resorting to foreign law 
materials”.62 
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 Finally, a particularly prominent example of the use of foreign law varying over time 
is in Japan. Whilst, in the early years (i.e. after World War II), the Supreme Court of Japan 
(SCJ) made reference to foreign law as it sought to establish some of its key legal principles, 
“[a]fter … [this] early period … the majority opinion of the SCJ stopped citing or referring to 
foreign or comparative law in constitutional cases”.63 Indeed, “between the period of 1 January 
1990 and 31 July 2008 … there is no case in which the majority opinion cites or refers to 
foreign or comparative law”.64 Since 2008, though, the trend appears to have reversed, with 
the SCJ once again making reference to foreign law. On this basis, Ejima opines that “[r]ecent 
judgments and decisions show that the SCJ is ready to refer to foreign and/or international law 
when it is useful for the SCJ to strengthen their conclusion. On the contrary, when it is not, the 
SCJ does not refer to foreign or international law”.65 
III. Conclusion 
It has been the intention of this article to provide a brief insight into the growing area of 
scholarship that focuses on judicial use of foreign law and to provide an explanation of Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism’s contribution to the field. The book offers a superb anthology of the way in 
which foreign law has come to be used in contemporary constitutional systems; Ferrari brings 
together some of the leading names in the field to compile a text that must be seen as the 
definitive authority in the area. What is particularly interesting from an examination of the 
book, though, is the varying ways and extents to which courts across the world use foreign law. 
Whilst some states make full and blatant use of foreign sources in their courts, there are a large 
number of examples of countries where the practice is covert, limited and has varied over time, 
as this article has sought to explain through its review of Judicial Cosmopolitanism. 
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